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Young, Gifford A. -- Full Employment Maintenance in the Private Sector.
Invariant full employment, ii: a full production, low inflation mode,
can be maintained in a dynamic free enterprise economy only by Providin g-
positive, periodically iterated, direction to individual private firma
concerning their net numerical employment actions. It is proposed that
each private sector entity above a certain size, after submitting a
periodic (e.g., quarterly) projection of its hiring or dismissal plans
(the procedure being built on experience with the Bureau of labor
Statistics job vacancy statistical series), be required to adjust its
net employment actions by a common percentage so as to maintain national
employment at a legislatively set rate. Feasibility lies in the frequent
opportunity for firms to submit new quarterly projections, increase in
consumer demand, realization of savings to the economy through avoidance of
unemployment-related expenditures, and growth of overall national production,
The proposed policy is justified by regarding cyclical F,nd structural
unemployment as consequences of interactive decisions of private firms
operating in a "prisoner's dilemma" game -situation. presort government policies
increase the ineluctable penalties in taxes, foregone production, and limited
success of fiscal and monetary policies inherent in competitive strategies,
but do not affect the critical decisions that accept such pena2ties.rather
than maintain invariant high employment and production:, F ourth Annual
Atlantic Economic Conference, Washington, DC, oct. 13-16 1 1976, National
Aeronautics and Space Administration, Washinton, DC 20546.
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PULL EMPLOYMENT 14AINTENANCE IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR
Gifford A. Young
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Washington, DC 20546
Fourth Annual Conference
Atlantic Economic Society
Washington, DC
October 13 -16, 1976
The interaction of decisions by independent private firms
constitutes a "prisoner's dilemma" game situation, in which
the firms ineluctably must accept persistent penalties of
recessions, high ur:employment- and welfare-related taxes, and
less-than-potential sales and profit. The "rules" of this
game prohibit present fiscal and monetary policies from being
fully effective. Opti-aam macroeconomic efficiency can be
achieved only by providing across-the-board positive direction
to every individual firm in such a way as to affect (to its
and all other firms' advantage) its hiring (customer-creating)
and concurrent production intentions. No central planning is
needeO or desirable: Full employment -- in a full production,
low inflation, "everybody wins" mode -- can be accomplished
in a dynamic free enterprise economy by reiterated impersonal
feedback directives that uniformly modify each firm's own
periodically submitted numerical hiring or firing projections.
The author is a specialist in the computerized processing of 	 a
technical information, and the proposal set forth in this paper 	 1
applies modern computer capabilities, game and decision concepts,
and communication feedback possibilities, rather than accepted
economic tools, to the problem of assuring invariant full employ-
ment. The views expressed are entirely his own.
x
Gifford A. Young
FULL EMPLOYMENT MAIN'T'ENANCE IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR
I propose a truly new policy altei:native for government Inter-
action with the private sector -- operating in an essentially froe
enterprise, free market economy -- to assure invariant full employ-
ment. The proposal is quite different from the more radical policies
(in the U.S, experience) of central planning and nationalisation of
private industry, But it is equally in strong contrast to the tradi-
tional Trir my reliance on fiscal stimulation accompanied by manpower
training and public service employment, in fact reducing these policies
to collateral or supportive roles.
Our readiness to consider new policy departures, even quite
speculative ones, should be motivated by a disquieting awareness both
of the present unsatisfactory performance of the economy and of apparent
trends toward increasing structural unemployment and loss of production
resulting from changes in area growth patterns, automation, consumer
demand, and resource availability.
Unemployment remains unacceptably high. Redistribution of goods
and services from private industry and employed workers to nonpro-
ductive consumers may be meeting increasing resistance, Urban centers
and some areas such as the Northeast continue to lose productive, tax-
paying jobs ••- New York City alone has lost 600,000 jobs since 1970.
Welfare is not shrinking; new welfare . pplications, often from those
who have used up their unemployment insurance benefits, are rising at
an unexpected rate in many areas.
Loss of revenue from full productive operation of the private
economy, and diversion of available federal, state, and local funds to
nonproductive unemployment and welfare needs, impact all of us, even if
we do not ourselves face immediate job insecurity. We may, for example,
have less police and fire protection. Our children may have lowered
educational opportunities. Those who are academics may find their
tenure threatened. Our retirement expectations, either through pri-
vate company plans; independent retirement arrangements, or Social
Security, represen > in total an enormous demand on future production
of goods and services. Whether we have secure and comfortable futures
may depend very directly on whether the economy can be brought up to
full production and maintained there consistently,
Fortunately, full, noncyclical employment can be maintained in an
essentially free enterprise economy, and without central planning or
even indicative planning. Furthermore, this can be done at no cost
to the taxpayer nor to private industry and -- in part as a consequence
of full correspondence between employment and production -- at greatly
reduced inflation.
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Operationally, full employment can be accomplished by applying the
data procossing and information feedback capabilities of modern com-
puter technology.
Conceptu).11y, however, it will be necessary for policy makers and
economists to broaden significantly their perception of feasible policy
relationships between government and the private sector, A major change
In the prevailing conceptual framework, what is sometimes called a
"paradigm shift," must occur,
The new concept to which we must shift is thist The government --
erercising • its responsibility of doing for private industry what it
cannot do for itself -- must provide positive direction to individual
firms concerning the net number of employees that each firm must hire
or refrain from firing -- to assure national full employment. But to
preserve free enterprise and -- it may sound paradoxical -- to preserve
the decision making power of the individual manager, this direction must
be based on each private firm's own numerical employment projections.
Fortunately, as will be a .';rent, this job cx'eation innovation can be
carried out in such a way .,^ to create equivalent new demand and
equivalent production to offset each firm's change in its work force.
This is an "everybody wins" proposal.
Let me develop the rationale for this complex -- but nevertheless
practicable -- full employment maintenance proposal, then illustrate
how the system might work in actual practice,
SLIDE l
The first slide lints some desirable characteristics that an
effective full employment program, operating in a free enterg,`ise
system, should have, Of particular note, one characteristic is that
such a program should not be costly; it should not, that is, require
Congress to appropriate billions of dollars. Just as at the micro-
economic level of the private firm, in which setting up a production
system such as an assembly line may produce output all out of pro-
portion to the cost of the management and engineering skills that went
into its design, so a macro management system to assure full employ-
ment should incur only very modest expenses, such as those for systems
design and computer operation.
SLIDE 2
The next slide is merely to remind us of the very considerable
concern being shown by Congress over the continuing loss of national
production caused by persistent unemployment, as well as the personal
loss to the unemployed. These representative bills emphasize differ-
ing aspects of the problem in accordance with the sponsors' differing
perception of the result of government action. Some propose increasing
economic planning, offering the private sector tax credits and wage
subsidies, or assuring jobs by having the government act as the em-
ployer of last resort. Others emphasize fiscal measures to encourage
inves'Gment, to reduce discrimination because of youth or age, or to
break down other barriers that the sponsor perceives as inhibiting
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workers from entering the labor force. It does not appear that any of
these bills 1s positive in the sense that it would assuro invariant full
employment, preclude future recessions, and offset new hiring by corres-
pond1n8ly increasing consumer demand and production; the reasons will
become apparent with the development of my proposal.
SLIDE ^
This slide is presented to illustrate the prevailing perception of
the permissible framework within which the government may seek solutions
for unemployment. This is a report of a study requested by Senator
Muskie on measures that might stimulate the economy temporarily, then
expire when no longer needed. Economists of the Congressional Budget
Office, undLr the direction of Alice Rivlin, put a great deal of effort,
using several econometric models, into this report. Note the alter-
natives that were studied. Together with monetary policy, these pretty
well bound the prevailing concepts of possible means to counter re-
cessions and stimulate employment. Clearly, these traditional procedures
do not exhibit all the desirable characteristics shown on my first
slide. They may help achieve a somewhat greater number of jobs in
the short term, but neither separately nor in combination can they .p=11-
ise a positive, satisfactory answer to the problem of maintaining
invariant, noncyc'lical full employment.
However, if applied in support of a more positive program in-
volving direction to -- and feedback from -- individual firms and
organizations in the private sector, they might make an effective
contribution to achieving this goal.
SLIDE 4
Certain critical perceptional defects that underlie the in-
effectiveness of prevailing approaches to analyzing and designing
full employment programs are indicated on this slide.
Econometric modelling, of course, uses. the computer extensively,
but not -to act specifically on the unique data elements that each
one of millions of individual firms might submit nor to feedback
information to specific firms on what might be called an individualized
basis, Providing direction to individual firms concerning employ-
ment action has apparently received no consideration by policy analysts
and economists, although there is a willingness to consider overall
planning of the economy; for example, setting production goals.
That the private sector, with its expertise in marketing analysis and
production engineering and economics, could effectively decide and
meet optimum output in a full employment economy, provided the govern-
ment could provide some information and numerical direction concerning
employment actions, has not, to the best of my knowledge, ever been
evaluated as a promising government policy.
The last item on this slide, concerning the failure to analyze
the interactions of competitive private firms as a non-zero-sum game,
one in which all firms can lose by certain decisions they make, or all
j
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can win, touches on a hypothesis. The hyl*-Lhosis is that much of cycli-
cal and even structural unemployment -- and of course loss of production
and profit -- is the consequence of interactive business decisions and
A best explicated by game and decision theory. As this hypothesis is
so basic to ur,Mstanding the feasibility of a program of directed pri-
vate sector full employment, I would like to expand in some detail on
this particular point.
SLIDE 5
Let's imagine two hypothetical economies as suggested on this slide.
In the first, Economy I, the entire economy consists of only one vast
firm, which hires everybody, produces everything, and provides the only
sales outlet for all consumer goods and services. However, there is a
government which req uires the firm to pay substantial benefits to any-
one that it might dismiss or retire.
Under these circumstances, would there be any unemployment?
Obviously not. The firm, with its full information as to income
and outgo, would be well aware that it was actually producing all
goods and services being turned over to unemployed or retired non-
producing individuals. It would be aware that a worker on the job
normally produces more than he consumes, the surplus going into re-
placement of capital equipment and,justifi.ably so, to the income of
top management, The firm would certainly have a strong preference
for keeping the worker on the job. Furthermore, the government's
insistence on high unemployment and retirement benefits would in-
crease the cost penalty to the firm of dismissing a worker so as to
make it worthwhile to retain him even if the value of his production
dropped somewhat below his wages, But actually, and based purely on
economic interest, the firm would be strongly motivated to plan its
operations in such a way that all its workers would be continuously
productive. Only those who became truly unemployable would be retired.
Very importantly, the unit firm could take the long view. There
would be no youth unemployment. The firm would hire all new job entrants,
even if necessary at pay somewhat above the worth of their actual output,
and provide them with on-the-job training, knowing that in time they
would become productive employees -- and also knowing that they would
have no opportunity of offering their experienced services to any com-
petitor. The single firm would, by the benign compulsion of economic
interest, see to it that structural unemployment never developed.
But suppose that this single vast organization were split into
two competing firms (Economy II). There would be apparent advantages,
but unfortunately the economy would suddenly have unemployment, en-
forced early retirement in lieu of dismissal, a sizable portion of
the population on welfare, and a growing government sector attempting
to overcome the private sector's failure to provide full employment.
This would all cost a great deal in tares imposed on the private sector --
necessarily, as it has all the production capabilities and taxes are,
e
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we sometimes forget, really the redistribution of goods and services.
It would also be accompanied by inflation because of the loss of the
proper tradeoff between production (by employed workers) and consump-
tion (now by both employed and unemployed workers) as well as by the
government's adherence to Keynesian principles --perhaps incorrectly
applied -- in attempting to stimulate the economy.
Why would the mere split into two firms result in this seemingly
irrational, "everybody loses;" behavior? The answer may be made
clear by considering the game-theory payoff matrix on the next slide.
SLIDE 6
This is the familiar "prisoner's dilemma,° which, in so many
game situations, brings afflictions on mankind ranging from armament
races to unemployment. In this game, both players stiffer because each
one fears that the other will double-cross him if he acts rationally.
In this particular case, each player is a firm which has the optional
strategies of hiring or not hiring its share of the last increment of
the unemployed. Here, "share" means the respective proportion of new
hires that would, by their purchases, generate a certain additional
demand for the firm's products and services, the production of whir;,
would be just met by the on-the-job efforts of the new employees.
(It is assumed, of course, thatthe new workers are free to shop at
either firm's sales outlets and will do so, and that the firms are
able by market analysis to forecast their respective increase in sales.)
"Increment" means the difference between the actually observed rate
of unemployment and a certain optimum, probably just the transitional,
between-jobs rate,
If both firms would hire their share, as in Block 1, both would
benefit, Neither would have to transfer goods and services, in the form
of taxes, to the nonproducing unemployed. Both would have higher sales,
in proportion to their share of the workers hired. Both would have a
better force of trained employees. There would be lower or no inflation.
But this is not what happens. The firms do not employ their share
and do not choose this "everybody wins" strategy. Firm A realizes that
if it hired its sha7:e, Firm B might not, and then B would benefit at
A's expense (Block 2). Firm A's net+ employees would spend part of their
paychecks at B's store. Firm B would likely hire away some of A's workers
after they had gone through A's expensive training program. (For this
reason, youth unemployment would be high, for neither f5rTa could count
on reaping the benefit of training a particular new worker -- unless
both firms hired their respective shares, in which case any job-hopping;
would balance out.)
Firm A also finds its payroll taxes for unemployment insurance to
be increasing, and it pays large taxes to the government for redistri-
bution to welfare recipients and for other unemployment-related purposes,
but it has lost all. information as to who gets what. If A hired an
additional worker, it would have no assurance that its tax payment
would be reduced.proportionately; A would then be paying B's taxes.
.	 I	 I
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(Nanagcment's loss of information is furthered by taxes being imposed
on his employers, stockholders, and interest recipients, although, be-
cause the management mediates between all income and outgo, the firm
actually pays all these as well as those levied directly.)
Pirm A also, quite rationally, tends to avoid committing any re-
sources to expansion, until convinced that a trend is developing and
both it and Firm 13 appear to be moving in the direction of meeting
increased demand, which clearly comes about less rapidly just because
of the firms mutually dragging their feet.
As Firm B anticipates corresponding behavio^ in all these ways on
A's part (Block g), both firms end up choosing no-hire, mutually
harmful strategies of Block 4.
Furthermore, both firms might be caught up in various common social
attitudes and prejudices that lead them to harmful decisions. Neither
firm might hire some particular minority .,and thus both lose out on
potential abilities and competence, yet what they perceive as a rationale
for this may be just the result of the other firm's also having practiced.
the same prejudice. Firms might not locate stores in the central city
because they perceive such a step as presenting crime problems anal, as
not earning much profit from the low-income inhabitants. Yet the basic
reason for the poverty and other perceived social problems may be just
the mutual interaction of competing organizations operating under this
"prisoner's dilemma" type of strategy.
Reacting in this way, the firms -- and by extension our present
complex economy of millions of firms -- could by competitive but inter-
active decisions "redline" entire areas and large populations, effectively
placing them outside the functioning economy of production and consump-
tion. This clearly is happening today, although as a result the private.
sector mist pay out billions of dollars in rising unemployment insurance;
in providing welfare, food stamps, and other social services conditioned
by the existence of high unemployment; in fighting crime -- more of wh'.ch
may have subtle roots in long-term unemployment than commonly thought;
and in the lost opportunities for making use of more experienced better
trained workers. At the same time, the private sector must forego
hundreds of billions of dollars in lost production. And all because
private business entities are caught in a "prisoner's dilemma" type of
game and must play by its rules.
Now we may judge why the present efforts to achieve full employ-
ment are not effective. Extending unemployment and welfare benefits,
granting revenue sharing funds to cities, offering employment tax credits
to industry, and in other ways transferring goods and services from the
productive portion of the economy to nonproductive consumers, simply
increase the penalties that are incurred by firms choosing the mutually
harmful strategies in Block 4. But these policies do not affect the
decision nrocess that leads the firms to accept these penalties.
Fiscal and monetary policies (by changing the rules of the game 	 8
slightly) may cause fluctuations in business decisions that temporarily
a
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cause the firms to hire part of the unemployed, but this will not be
sustained -- a downturn in the business cycle will occur sooner or
later -- and for the same reasons the natural equilibrium decision be-
tween competing firms is to opt for the mutually harmful Block 4
strategics.
No present government policies tackle the real problems How are
, some
e game is in order.
It is interesting that the authors of a text on games and decisions
(Luce and Haiffa) speak directly to this point concerning the "prisoner's
dilemma" type of business interacti.oriss
"...some hold the view that one essential role of government is to
declare that the rules of certain social "games" must be changed
whenever it is inherent in the game situation that the players, in
pursuing their own ends, will be forced into a socially undccir=ble
position."
Precisely. This is just saying that the government should do for
private industry what i!. cannot do for itself, And -the one rule change
that would assure that firms invariably choose the "everybody wins"
solution, in which each hires its share of the last increment of un-
employed, would be for the government to step in and direct them
eq uitably to do so. The firms would then perforce consistently adopt
the strategies in Block 1, and both would benefit substantially.
The question, of course, i.ss "What is each firm's numerical
share?"
One -- a government analyst, that is -- could try to,decide this by
taking into accounit the size of each firm, its number of employees, its
product line, its sales volume and profits, its labor intensiveness,
and so on, with due consideration of continual demand changes in a
dynamic economy, The difficulties of such a scheme in an economy of
millions of firms Is obvious as soon as stated. Instead, let's ac,ept
the fundamental free enterprise proposition that each firm's own
management is best able to make such judgments in its own interest,
The relative shares can then be determined in a natural and dynamic
manner on the basis of each firm's own periodic hiring projections.
Here are the steps that might be involved in such a full, employ-
ment procedures
SLIDr 7
The first step, very reasonably, would be to rind out, say each
calendar quarter, what every private sector entity --not just
business firms, bat also hospitals, research institutes, laxge farms
(which have recently had to begin paying unemployment insurance),
and any other, nongovernmental organization that hires people -- plans
to do in the way of hiring or firing during the coming three months.
i
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(A shorter or longer period might be used if' experience so indicates,
just as some lower limit might be placed on the size of participating
organizations.)
SLIDE 8
Fortunately, we find that systems desigct.,rs and computer experts
at the Bureau of Labor Statistics have made our job conceptually easier
by their development and testing of statistical programs to produce
useful data to print in the F.onthly Labor review. The form shown in
this slide is used to collect data from individual companies on their
monthly, not just quarterly, hiring, firing, quits, layoffs, departures
for military service, etc.
Part III, located by the arrow, is the significant part for our
purposes. Here the company reports the number of job openings for which
it is actively recruiting by advertising, registering with the employ-
ment service, and so on.
The first column under Part III lists the number of openings that
the firm is ready to fill i.mmedlately, while the second column (filled
out the next month) gives the nmboi of theUe job openings that the firm
has not filled for a month or longer. The third column is a true pro-
jections the number of job openings that the company plans to fill in
the future;-to staff, say, a planned branch office, or because the firm
expects more business. (A company that was retrenchin g could conceivably
report negative numbers in the job openings spaces on such a form, al-
thosgh the Bureau did not collect such data,)
Also note Part IV, where reasons may be entered for hiring or not
hiring workers, or conceivably, laying off or discharging them.
Part III is not now in use by the Bureau of labor Statistics, but
job vacancy data were collected over -the period 1969 up to 1974 from
manufacturing and mining firms. At one time the Bureau considered ex-
tending this test program to all service and nonagricultural industries.i
I want.tc stress that the Bureau is interested only in statistical
tabulations. The individual firm's identity is lost in the data analysis
and publication of columns of figures -- quite different from what I
propose. What is important is that we experience a sense of reality
concerning a directed full employment program by being aware that at
least 40,000 firms already have had the experience of submitting their
hiring projections to a government agency. Furthermore, they have done
this on a completely voluntary basis.
SLIDE 9
The next step, although this one would. involve only infrequent
changes, not quarterly reiteration, would be for Congress, on the best
advice of economists and businessmen, to set an upper limit on permitted
level of unemployment. This would have to be high, enough to permit
flexibility in business operations, as by not creating too tight a job
market, and perhaps to permit some degree of unemployment swing during
1, Job Vacancies in Manufacturing # 1969-73• Paul 14. Armknect, Jr.
Monthly labor review 97, No. 8 (August 1974) pp. 27`33
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a business cycle, down to, say, 3 percent ini back if the legislatively
set standard war, 4 percent. ('fhc full employment maintenance prog;rr;m
would be a powerful device to dampen cyclical sWingr, in busineus, both
by maintaining customer expectations and motivating more careful mar-
ket projections and investment timing.)
During initial implementation of the directed full employment
program, a phased approach downward, from the present excessively high
level would probably be desirable for optimum private sector ajust-
ment, but this should not be allowed to drug on too long, of course,
SLIDE 10
It would be necessary to make a fairly accurate determination of
the number of expected additions to the labor force during; the coming
quarter. Once a full employment maintenance program was well into its
permanent operation, this should not be difficult. The number to be
dismissed would have been projected by the participating firms, and the
new labor force entrants, assuming that the problem of hidden unemploy-
ment will have disappeared by then, should be rather litated in number..
Knowing the total work force, and subtracting the fixed percentage set
by Congress, it would be a straightfor:raxd computer computation to
compare the result with the sum of the positive and negative job pro-
jections by all the participating firms. If the overall private sector
projections did riot come up to the total needin jobs (this need not be
the case; the sum could e q ual or exceed the number seeking work), a
uniform percentage would be calculated by which Tmivate industry must
adjust its hiring -- or, for some firms, firing; - to assure full em-
ployment, and with it the full aggregate demand and production feasible
with existing technology and resources.
Use of a simple percentage multiple across all the firms $ pro-
jection may be quesi;ioned. The set of numerical projections would
consist of hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions, of unique data
elements, Hiring; plans would range widely from zero to fairly large
numbers, while retrenchment plans by firms intending to reduce the
number of their employees likewise would range from a few to very many,
The problem is to raise this set of numbers along an axis of net new
hiring so that the overall total increases by just the necessary
amount to insure full employment. It is important that the trans-
positions the individual firms must make are equitable in the sense
of not disturbing their immediate competitive position, as well as
being appropriate to their snares of the increased business hat will
result from all the .firms  raising their sights just a bit. A simple
percentage upgrading applied to all the projections should work as
well as any more complicated algorithm.
SLIDE 11
The computer-printed notifications that the participating firms re-
ceive would. be rather simple, perhaps merely repeating the original
projection by the firm, the uniform percentage change that all firms must
- 10
make„ and the resulting pormitted hiring or firing figure. One firm
Intending to accession 100 not. 1.s!ivi.duals during the coming three months
might receive a notice that the uniform percentage adjustment had been
found to be 2. percent; therefore -the firm must accession 102 not individuals.
Another firm planning to scixxrate 100 net workers would receive noLifi-
cation that it is permitted to droponly LB 'during the period. (Both
firms would, of course, have the opportunity of making new projections
at the beginning of the next quarter, generally a short period in
business operation.)
A firm projecting zero change would, under this simple formulation,
not be required to change Its plans at all.
After the program had been well established, with all that means
in the development of publr c consciousness of its operation, adjust-
ment of management's perso,:nel concept:,, establishment of advisory
services, etc., it might be expected that most firms would plan their
operations so closely in line with anticipated results of the full. err,-
ployment feedback directives that they mould not in general be required
to make any significant adjustments.*
I have found in preliminary discussions that many find this
particular. prescription for directing full employment hard to picture
in operation, with two commonly expressed difficulties: (1) that the
firms will be harmed in some way; (2) that the firms will cheat or
somehow escape from the program's operation.
It is important to consider whether the participating firms are
being imposed upon. In spite of our discussion about "everybody wins"
game strategies, are these companies in fact being tared in some way
to take care of a few superfluous workers for whom they have no meaning-
ful productive jobs? Well ? let's consider the situation from the
point of view first of the manager of the firm that is expanding,
lie is looking out at an economy in which aggregate demand is being
raised across the board, A share of this can be expected to come in
to his firm as additional customer orders, either directly from in-
dividuals or from firms adding to their itiventories or producti,n
equipment, and this sh,_re should be reasonably proportionate to his
projections, assuming market analysis has some degree of accuracy.
What has happened is that his firm, together with all others, must
have been somewhat low, on average, in its market surveys and pro
gduction plannin, otherwise the combined projections would have
matched the number of new labor force members and their potential
aggregate demand perfectly. Through the full employment maintenance
program, the ,government has sent each firm a powerful message that
its projections were somewhat off. This advice alone should result
in his firm changing its marketing and production plans tc aecommo-
date to a .larger economy. Reasonably, he, too, would need to gear up
to better demand than he had projected and in doing so would readily
find a place for the few additional employees in his greater than ex-
pected business. In the case of the company that was retrenching, it
is reasonable that its projections were •too pessimistic, and that
because of the overall growth of the economy enough additional business
will have been generated to ,justify keeping a few men on a few weeks longer.
*It is important to note that the firms would still have all the advantages
of individuality shown on Slide 5 (Economy II) while the economy gnina
the advantages of no unemployment, etc. (Economy I).
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Of considerable help in raising the nwnber of employees or slow-
ing down the rate of dischargos is the very great turnover that actually
takes place in all industries. The figures arc reported in the Monthly
Labor Roview.
Another element of feasibility is the fact that the program is
based on projections of incremental hiring, not on each firm's over-
all work force. This automatically takes into account the important
factor of relative labor intensiveness. For a given expansion of the
economy, a petroleum refinery would not project that it needed as
many new employees as would a furniture factory, so the uniform per-
cc ntage ad,',ustment would closely relate the number of workers to the
number of jobs needed to meet the actual growth in business In each
case, (Ielative turnover, among various industries also is reported in
the Monthly Labor Review.)
But the most important reason for successful oporation with bono-
fit to every participating firm is the reiteration of the whole process
every three months. If a firm is somewhat off in Vs planning, it can
correct it in its nest q uarter's projections, Remember, after the full
employment maintenance procedure had been implementer:, each firm would
have experienced its operation during the preceding three months and
will aeain.durine the quarter after the one being considered. There
would be a constant a::nstment process going on that not only would
iron out any diffic iti,s but would be a Krong factor in smoothing out
the remaining bualwass cycle.
As for the possibility of a firm cheating, there world be two
powerful motivating forces to enamor nny arch effort;
(1) Substantial penalties would be assessed for failure to com-
ply with the full employment directives. Actual imposition
of such penalties would likely be as infrequent as fining
someone for driving 90 miles per hour, for, with experience,
responsible concerns would come to the rational conclusion Wat
the regulations were ofsubstantial benefits to them as wall
as to society in general,
(2) Each firm would recognize that if it deliberately set its
hiring projection low -- as it would have a perfect right to
do -- it would tend to lose out in its competitive position,
In a full employment economy it might have trouble catching
up on production during the coming months. Management would,
of course, be fully at liberty to make its own expansion plans,
and the added competitive thrust of participating in the full
employment process might be a strong stimulus to encouraging
productivity gains, with benefits to all -- now that auto-
mation and efficiency would not result in displaced workers
possibly suffering an indefinite period of lost. time until.
being relocated, and the overall economy not suffering the
loss, even a relatively short term loss, of their productive
capabilities.
1. All firms must eventually report on the number of those actually
employed by their payment of Social: Security taxes and unemployment
insurance.
i
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Note that Ill this Inoccdure for continuous adjustment of employ-
ment projections, there is no central planning, just a computerized
response to each firm ' s own independent and competitive intentions.
The operation is essentially free enterprise. Feedback of information
In this way simply facilitates the working of the " invisible hand."
Firms that can most effectively develop and meet consumers' needs and
desires will grow, while others will decline, just as they do today.
Within reason, it is probably desirable that government retire from ex-
cessive intervention in this process, and the proposed full employment
maintenance program would make it practicable and humanely feasible for
government to do so.
Some aspects of government disentanglement may not necessarily be
welcomed by businessmen. Fbr example, in the full employment mainte-
nance program here proposed, there are no tax credits or wage subsidies,
to employers. Where would the funds for such payments come. from? The
private sector, of course, One consequence of the directed hiring
program would be the automatic adjustment of workers to productive jobs.
Any such transfer of funds from one pocket to another would simply
distort the normal relationship between production and consumption;
e.g., by taking money from a consumer so that he would have to give
up his hopes of buying, say, an automobile, and paying it to a worker
to produce the automobile. Such attempts to externalize a firm's
actual costs, as by providing it with income from other than its own
productive efforts, are normally undesirable. (It is recognized that
during the initial implementation of the full employment maintenance
procedure, or during crises such as the oil embargo, some type of
temporary transfer of resources between parts of the economy might be
needed, with full recognition of the probable disruptive economic effects.)
SLIDE 12
This slide stresses that the important role that monetary and fis -
cal policies will continue to play in smoothing the operation of the
economy, nevertheless is the last step in the full employment maintenance
procedure. That is, these policies are subsidiary to and supportive of
the primary procens, the automatic data processing or employment pro-
jections and feedback to the individual firms involved, Because the
full employment procedure is self-stimulating, by creating customers as
new porkers are hired, fiscal and money managers could apply their
skills modestly to meet real business and consumer needs rather than
excessively and erratically to stimulate the economy. Perhap s it woulG
be possible to reduce the normal growth of the money supply to the 2 per
cent or so that Arthur. Burns has sometimes mentioned as desirable. In
any event, lifting the burden of almost sole responsibility for tur<ing
the economy from fiscal and monetary policies should be a ,powerful
factor in bringing inflation down to a mere reasonable annual rate.
SLIDE 13
I have presented what I believe to be the definitive and unique
Solution to the problem of ending unemployment in a free economy.
n13
Certainly it must be regarded as speculative; there are many aspects
that need in-de pth analysis, such as the problem of layoffs as con-
trasted. to dismissals, the impact of import-export fluctuations, how
rapidly the economy could, move back into the vacuum that has developed
in cities, crisis management in the-.event of a new oil embargo, the
problem of slowing national growth, and so on. Many of these difficulties
are not barriers to acceptance of the principle of maintaining full em-
ployment by positive direction . but involve quantitative decisions on
precise size of the permitted rate of unemployment or the schedule on
which this figure could be approached so that the complex interactions
of millions of firms could best adjust smoothly to a higher production,
higher employment economy. Such evaluations fall naturally vithin the
competence of professional economists.
What I hope for from my presentation is that economists and policy
makers will have (1) a flash of insight, of recognition that direction
to the private sector by the flexible feedback system I have proposed
is the viable route for progress toward full employment, and (2) a
readiness  to commit some effort and resources toward fully exploring
the concept by economic analysis and simulation. I believe that the re-
sulting evidence would be so compelling that the investigators, and
Congress and the Administration, would confidently move on to the
further implementation steps listed oil 	 slide.
SLIDE 1U•
To justify investigations on this concept, the tremendous payoff
for a successful „irking procedure to maintain full employment is shown
on this last slide. These are just rough estimates, of course; the
benefits in 10 years could be much greater than shown -- because, if you
will recall my introductory remarks, the present trends in lost pro-
duction, lost revenue, growth in nonproductive demand, even lost
capital stock and production capabilities as the cities decay, are all.
adverse and indicative of accelerating costs to our economy if we per-
sist in our failure to find a full-production solution.
You will note the analogy on this slide that the cost savings and
added production that would be gained by implementing the pp^sed full
employment program are so vast that they would pay the LyploaS zncomes
of 20 million Americans. In closing, I would like to draw another
analogy suggested by a rough equivalent to the actual wealth represent-
ed. by the figure of $265 billion: Gne hundred and seventy-three years
ago, President Thomas Jefferson's diplomats closed the Louisiana Pur-
chase, buying all or parts of 13 of our present states and some of
Canada, for the stun of only $15 million. Resource-rich continents
are no longer to be discovered or purchased piecemeal. Today, the
sources of wealth are to be found in advanced technology and mathe-
matics, in operations research, in systems studies, and. in the applica-
tion of computers to industrial operations and management. By applying
these modern tools, as I have attempted -to do superficially in this
presentation, economists could add the equivalent of one Louisiana
Purchase to the nation's gross national product overy year. And,
curiously, if the method. used were the computerized positive direction
method I have proposed, the cost would be equivalently as small as its
purchase price.
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